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1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the study is to review those systems of resources which, on 
the one hand, promote the increase of the financial independence of local 
governments in Hungary, on the other hand, allow equalisation among the 
local governments with different income capacities. The first objective 
belongs to the issue of the regulation of the tasks and resources of local 
governments, while equalisation is only partially dealt with by the 
regulation of local governments. These tools are mainly designed to 
moderate the present differences in the income generating capacity, partly 
by the redistribution of the resources (e.g. personal income tax, 
supplementary subsidy), partly by a more efficient cost control of the supply 
of tasks (e.g. the stimulation of associations). Another set of tools are to 
increase the income generating capacities, these belong, however, to the 
issue of regional policy, in which local (county, municipal) governments are 
also important actors. 
The impact of the socio-economic transition was different in the large 
regions of Hungary. In the period of the 1990s passed so far, regional 
disparities increased, but this is the result of a multi-factor process. Due to 
the centrally supported programmes, equalisation processes took place in 
the infrastructural provision. At same time, the winners of economic 
restructuring – mainly as a consequence of the activity of foreign capital – 
are the traditionally more advanced Hungarian regions: the capital city and 
its agglomeration, (North-west) Transdanubia, and the large towns. This can 
be seen in the differences of the income generating potential, e.g. personal 
income tax, local tax potential. 
The change of the regional disparities, either strengthening or reduction, 
is dominantly determined by the change in the income generating capacity 
of Hungary, the expected growth rate of the gross domestic product. A 
significant reduction, however, can only be expected if induced by a strong 
growth of the GDP. Independent of this, the tools and institutional system of 
regional development have to be made capable of the promotion of both 
economic modernisation and regional equalisation. This objective is served 
by the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning, passed in the 
spring of 1996, by the institutional system established according to the act 
(regional development councils at different levels), and by the system of 
central and decentralised resources allocated to the institutional system. 
However, there has been but a little harmony so far among the funds which 
directly or indirectly (by sectoral developments) serve regional 
development. Both kinds of support are available for the local governments 
and their regional development associations, but the support system, which 
also requires own resources, usually favours settlements with better income 
positions. 
After the systemic change, the regulation of the local governmental 
system was motivated by a comprehensive effort for decentralisation. This 
is a double process, if we look at public services. On the one hand, with 
building out the local governmental system, a decentralisation of tasks 
started between the central government and the local governments, on the 
other hand, state participation was gradually put into the background in 
those fields where the market and the private enterprises can work more 
effectively (this is privatisation in the broader sense of the word). Within the 
frameworks of the reform of the state budget, the objective, in order to 
achieve the economic balance, is to hold back communal consumption and 
as part thereof, to decrease the deficit of the central budget. This means a 
decrease in the amount of distributable resources, parallel to which the 
number of state tasks – and within that local governmental tasks – also 
decrease, and they are taken over by non-state (market and non-profit) 
service institutions. 
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2 Normative subsidy versus task financing 
 
After 1990 a local governmental institutional system was born which had 
to fulfil its tasks besides shrinking financial resources. In addition, these 
tasks were not clearly defined and they even changed during the years. The 
unfavourable conditions, however, were escorted by a large-scale 
independence, which allowed, in fact, forced some local governments to 
improve the efficiency of their operation and increase their non-central 
incomes. 
There seems to be a consensus – at least from the side of the local 
governments – that the tasks of the local governments are not clearly 
defined in the Act. The reason for that is not a legal inaccuracy, but the fact 
that there is no political decision on what tasks belong to the state and the 
local governments in the different fields of public services. During the 
transition to the market economy, the clear and well defined division of the 
tasks and competences only gradually takes form (Hegedûs-Péteri, 1996). 
Even when that is achieved, the question still remains what extent of the 
central supports is appropriate in the field of tasks accepted by the state but 
carried out by the local governments (e.g. public education). It is also an 
issue how this support guaranteeing an acceptable level is allocated among 
the local governments. This can take place either by a distribution method 
with general objectives but a normative basis, or by supports given for 
definite individual tasks, providing for a certain per cent of the estimated 
expenses. 
One of the most progressive elements in the finance system created at the 
systemic change is the transition from the expenditure-oriented planning 
method to the resource regulation. In this system, because of their weight, 
normative subsidies are key elements. This model of financing basically 
works as a distribution mechanism of the government supports allocated to 
the local governments. However, the more keys are used for this 
distribution, the more vulnerable this principle. As soon as in the first year 
of the allocation of the general Hungarian support (in 1990), a system 
consisting of more than 10 elements was used in the recommended budget. 
The number of these elements doubled by the year 1995. In 1996, the 
ground on which one could be eligible for support, decreased to 14, but, as a 
consequence of the differentiated support system of public education, the 
total of the normative elements is over 200. Their number decreased to some 
extent by 1997, but it still exceeds 100 (Darázs, 1996). No wonder that the 
individual normatives are slowly losing the meaning they should have (i.e. 
rates promoting the distribution of support for general purposes) and they 
are more and more treated as a partial financing for the tasks written in the 
specification of the given normatives. This can start a strong restoration 
towards the expense-oriented planning. 
The system of local supports has to follow four main guidelines (Bird 
and Wallich, 1992): 
1. The support is for gap-filling, as local governmental revenues 
are almost never enough to cover all expenses. So the supports are 
meant to “fill the financial gaps”. 
2. Supports should promote the formation of a vertical balance of 
the budget. The lack of balance comes from the different structure of 
tasks at the different levels of local governments, touching even the 
richest ones. 
3. The supports have to deal with the differences among the 
settlements at the same level (horizontal balance of the budget). 
4. Supports have to stimulate efforts made from local budgets in 
order to make settlements grow their own resources of income. 
Thus it has to be decided on what grounds tasks which are accepted by 
the state but carried out locally shuold operate and how the distribution of 
the state part in the financing of the voluntary local governmental tasks 
should take place. Two major concepts have been crystallised by the 
experts. Basically, both of them recommend the elimination of the present 
normative system in which equalisation and performance-linked normatives 
are mixing. 
One solution starts from the estimated demand of the local expenditure 
and the local income capacity, while the other from the definition of the 
tasks which also involve state participation (public education, social care 
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and benefits, health care), and from the share of state and local expenditure 
in these tasks. The first suggestion, in which the need for the support is 
defined as the difference of the demands of expenditure and the income 
capacity, contains all the above-mentioned characteristics of the supports. In 
the second model, the task-oriented support and the support designed to 
decrease and alleviate the significant differences in the incomes of the local 
governments are separated. The two versions are also identical in the sense 
that the so-called centralised preliminary estimates and the other individual 
targets of the supports (theatre, fire brigade, bankrupt local governments) 
should also be built into the uniform support system. Both solutions 
emphasise the importance of increasing the local income capacity and thus 
the financial independence of the local governments.  
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3 The increase of the financial independence of local  
 governments through the regulation of the resources 
 
3.1 The transition of the distribution of personal income tax  
 
The disputes over the regulation of the resources in the recent two years 
– especially in the period when the support system for the local 
governments from the state budget is defined for the following year – has 
often reached their climax about the division of the personal income tax 
between the central and the local level. Those who urged that local 
governments should receive a higher share, considered the decrease of their 
share as a decline in the financial independence of the local governments, 
and the increase as a strengthening of this independence. 
One of the main elements in the tax reform introduced in 1988 was the 
introduction of the taxation of private personal incomes in order to promote 
a general expansion of the paying of common charges. From the start, this 
type of tax was meant to help the financing of the local governments. The 
Parliament voted for the general introduction of personal income tax in the 
autumn of 1987 with the condition that after 1990 (with a two-year delay 
allowed for the technical implementation) the total of the incomes from the 
personal income tax will be allocated to the councils, in a way that the Tax 
and Financial Auditing Office (the Hungarian name of which is APEH), 
responsible for the administration of the taxation, will transfer the total 
amount of the personal income tax paid by the individual taxpayers to the 
council of their place of permanent residence. 
The background of this situation is that in the early 1980s, there were 
several attempts to divide the so-called urban and village development 
contribution among the councils. It could have been carried out already at 
that time, according to the registration of the employees by their place of 
residence, but given the level of the current technology it would have been 
too much administrative work for the employers. It was simpler to pay this 
amount to the council of the headquarters of the given companies. This way, 
however, this income dominantly functioned as an urban income. At the 
same time, it was also the period when strong efforts were made in order to 
strengthen the income resources of the villages and to equalise the income 
possibilities of the urban and village councils. The introduction of the 
personal income tax allowed that, as tax had to be paid to the central tax 
authority, and the registration of the taxpayers by their place of residence 
offered an easy solution for the transfer of the tax to the individual councils. 
The distribution mechanism of the personal income tax according to the 
original intentions – giving back 100% of the personal income tax to the 
councils, from 1991 to the local governments – only worked for one single 
year, until 1991. There were huge differences in the amount of personal 
income tax revenues per one inhabitant: while in Tiszaújváros almost 
15.000 HUF was the personal income tax revenue per capita, in Gagyapáti 
no taxable income was made. The difference between the settlements with 
the highest and the lowest tax revenues was forty-fold. By the mid-1990s, 
this difference typically grew to more than a hundred-fold. The specifically 
“richest” settlement – in the beginning Tiszaújváros, after 1993 
Százhalombatta – exceeded the countryside average more than three times 
in tax revenue per capita1. At the same time, in 90% of the settlements, the 
specific personal income tax index does not reach the countryside average 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1. 
Personal Income Tax potential per Capita, 1988-1996 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Settlement with the highest 
specific personal income tax 
payment 
(thousand HUF per capita)  
14,9 20,8 26,6 37,8 41,7 58,8 67,8 87,4 113,7 
Budapest (thousand HUF per 
capita) 
12,6 17,1 22,0 29,1 36,6 43,9 50,6 63,0 78,7 
Countryside average (thousand 
HUF per capita) 
5,3 7,0 9,6 12,4 15,5 19,0 21,4 27,6 34,9 
Highest figure/countryside 
avarege 
2,8-
fold 
3,0-
fold 
2,8-
fold 
3,0-
fold 
2,7-
fold 
3,1-
fold 
3,2-
fold 
3,2-
fold 
3,3-
fold 
Number of settlements with less 
than 1.000 HUF personal income 
tax per capita  
65 32 11 8 7 3 4 3 1 
Number of settlements with less 
than 10.000 HUF personal 
income tax per capita  
3.066 3.013 2.848 2.539 2.026 1.417 1.205 711 396 
Number of settlements below the 
countryside average 
2.755 2.792 2.804 2.810 2.844 2.849 2.863 2.799 2.808 
Proportion of settlements below 
the countryside average 
89,4 90,5 90,7 91,0 90,7 90,9 91,0 89,5 89,7 
Source: own calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance  
 
The reduction of such big differences in the income potential within an 
equalising or normative subsidy system was only possible by distributing 
personal income tax revenues between the central and local governmental 
level and spending the part remaining in the centre on equalisation purposes. 
The share reserved for equalisation changed several times: it was 50% in 
1991-1992, 30% in 1993-1994, 30+5% in 1995, 25+11% in 1996, 22+16% 
in 1997 and 20+20% in 1998. The part that remains in the centre is not an 
income deprivation, as it is more and more serves as a coverage for the 
normative subsidies (Table 2.). While the centralised personal income tax 
covered hardly one-third of the normative grants in 1991, this share is over 
80% these days. According to the figures in the recommendation for the 
1998 budget, in 1998 the total amount of personal income tax remaining in 
the centre will serve as a coverage for the normative state contributions, in 
fact, it will exceed that by some 5 billion HUF. This is not a negligible 
amount, especially when we consider that in 1997 this much was devoted by 
the Government, within the decentralised regional development fund, for 
that part which serves regional equalisation purposes and can be applied for 
by the local governments. 
 
Table 2. 
Personal Income Tax Coverage for Normative Subsidies in 1991-1998 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997* 1998* 
Normative state 
contribution (in billion 
HUF) 
148,5 169,8 207,5 210,6 232,7 231,7 260,2 275,4 
Central part of the personal 
income tax (in billion HUF) 
47,0 63,0 120,0 148,8 173,9 180,1 221,4 280,5 
Normative support covered 
from the personal income tax 
(in per cent) 
31,6 37,1 57,8 70,7 74,7 77,7 85,1 101,9 
* 1997 – planned, 1998 – legal recommendation for the budget (?) 
Source: own calculations based on the database from the TÁKISZ (Regional Data Service) 
 
The coverage part of the personal income tax shown in the table would 
be even higher if equalisation grants were not listed sometimes among the 
normatives and among the personal income tax items remaining in place 
other times. The seemingly increased local share from the personal income 
tax sounds good politically to some of the local governments. It would be 
more reasonable, however, to feature the +5, +11, +16 and +18% shares 
remaining in place in the normative subsidies block or in a separate 
equalisation support block. The argument for the first solution – in case that 
the system of normative subsidies lasts for a longer period of time – is that 
the total amount of the part of the personal income tax which remains in the 
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centre is still a resource for normative subsidies, and for the latter solution is 
that the equalisation grants could be simplified and standardised this way. 
This also requires that the remaining equalisation type elements – municipal 
administration, communal and sports tasks, tasks of public education – be 
taken out from the normatives. 
Sometimes it is argued that the tension in the financing would be less if 
local governments did not have to wait for two years to obtain their personal 
income tax revenues. As a result of different effects (tax rates, tax brackets, 
allowances, exemptions, inflation etc.), in the first part of the 1990s the 
revenues coming from the personal income tax grew by 40-50 billion HUF 
annually, so a transition from a system with a two-year delay of the 
acquisition of the resources to a system where the currently paid taxes could 
be used would result in an extra 100 billion HUF personal income tax 
revenue. This gain is only a seeming one in the present situation, as the 
paying out of the personal income tax paid two years ago in the same 
monthly instalments (?) can evidently take place from the current advance 
personal income tax payments. This means that the paying out of resources 
adjusted to the estimated personal income tax payments appears as an extra 
demand within the state budget in the given year. This extra demand could 
only be met by increasing the deficit, taking up approximately 100 billion 
HUF public loan. This would, on the one hand, disturb the expectations 
concerning the level of the deficit of the state budget, on the one hand, 
increase the outstanding total debt with a large item. The transition would 
also make the administrative procedure more complicated, as the 
supplementary settlement of the accounts of the transfers would be a new 
task (paying out according to the estimated revenue, minus settlement of the 
accounts according to the real revenues). 
Summing up the possibility of keeping up the personal incomes as a 
divided revenue, the following statements can be made: 
⇒ the divided personal income tax can be a stable resource of 
income for the local governments in the long run, which, because of 
the amount of resources known from the two-year technical delay, can 
be easily planned. Given the present trends, the personal income tax 
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remaining in the centre will totally cover both normative subsidies and 
personal income tax supplementary subsidies; 
⇒ planning would be made even easier if, one the hand, the system 
of personal income tax itself (tax rates, tax brackets, exemptions etc.) 
was more stable, on the other hand, if the proportions of the division 
remained unchanged for longer periods of time or if the schedule of 
the annual changes was made for four-year cycles; 
⇒ it is not advised to mix the “clear” part of the personal income 
tax remaining in place and the personal income tax “burdened with 
tasks”. The latter one should either be built in to the normative 
subsidy system or into a uniform and simplified equalisation system; 
⇒ In the system of the divided personal income tax, local 
governments are interested in a passive revenues (?). Their share from 
this resource depends on their positions gained in the change of the 
rates of division, and in the rates of the normatives and equalisation 
grants financed from the central personal income tax. In case of an 
active economic development activity, however, the provision of the 
unemployed with jobs can amount to a surplus personal income tax 
resource, and parallel to that, the tension in the field of social care 
(benefits) can decrease. 
 
3.2 Systems of surtaxes 
 
In the following chapter, the possibilities of the application of surtaxes in 
the Hungarian local governmental finance system will be discussed in three 
sections. The first section is an introduction to the historical traditions in 
Hungary; the second one provides an international view in this field, while 
the third section sums up the recommendations of some expert groups 
concerning the levying of surtaxes on personal incomes. 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Traditions in Hungary 
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Before the introduction of the council system, the surtaxes on the central 
taxes were an important element in local governmental management. In the 
period of the Compromise, those taxes that the towns could not cover from 
its resources, had to be paid from the borough-rates. Borough-rates were 
levied after the royal direct taxes (?) in a per cent that was enough for 
paying the uncovered expenses (Bükki, 1991). After 1870 the situation 
changed, inasmuch as tax revenues became the basis for the coverage of the 
expenses and other revenues became supplementary. The rates of the 
borough-rates were defined together with the expenditure forecast and they 
were jointly approved of by the Ministry of Interior. The real volume of the 
tax revenues could be influenced by the base and the rate of the central tax, 
the rate of the surtax and the efficiency of the collection of the taxes. The 
collection of the taxes was the responsibility of the local governments at that 
time, and its efficiency was rather poor in the discussed period (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. 
 Tax Revenues and Overdues in City of Győr 1873-1876 
 1873 1874 1875 1876 
Rate of the local tax (in per cent) 55 75 60 50 
Amount of approved local tax (HUF) 94.000 131.200 105.000 94.000 
Total of overdues gathered by the end of the year (HUF) 113.600 74.000 83.000 88.000 
Share of the overdues at the end of the year (in per cent) 120 56 79 93 
Source: Bükki (1991) based on Tables 1. and 2. 
 
Between the two world wars, the major part of the revenues of the 
municipalities came from taxes resigned by the state, and from local taxes, 
municipal duties and contributions. When the above-mentioned revenues 
were not enough to cover the expenses of the budget of the town, a local 
surtax could be levied, depending on the deficit, but not exceeding 50% (in 
the counties, 30%) of that, based on the amounts of the direct state taxes 
(land, real estate, …, and corporate taxes). It was a general rule that the total 
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amount of state taxes and local surtaxes could not exceed 75% of the total 
income of the taxpayer. The joint expenses of the associating villages were 
divided among the individual villages according to the share from the 
amounts flowing in from the direct state taxes and the general income tax, 
or according to the burden bearing capacity of the villages. The royal tax 
supervisor or the Ministry of Interior made sure that the rate of the surtax 
should not exceed the maximum level. It was a rule that the budgets had to 
be handed in to the above-mentioned organs for approval (Páll, 1991). 
In the second half of the 1920s, the state decreased the revenues of the 
local governments with some minor modifications. These included the 
decrease of some items of the direct taxes, which automatically decreased 
the amount of the village surtax, too. It was also typical of this period that 
the state tried to shift a part of their burdens to local governments, without 
transferring the coverage for them. These individually would not have 
meant a problem, but their total sum amounted to 7.5% of the annual 
expenditure of local governments by the late 1920s, without these extra 
local governmental expenses increasing the quantity or quality of the 
services connected to these expenses. Practically the state freed itself from 
some burdens and blocked local governments from the free disposition of 
their own revenues (Éberth, 1931). 
The supporters of the local governmental system disputed the system in 
effect. They approved of the principle that the state and the villages (towns) 
should decide upon the volume of the taxes based on the tax paying 
capacities of the citizens in the future too, but they urged a taxation based 
on the individual interests in the villages (towns), because of the nature of 
the needs of the local governments and their effect on the welfare of the 
individuals. 
It was raised that the system of the village surtax and the share from the 
direct taxes not only do not meet the demands of the villages (towns), but 
they also make a significant part of the revenues dependent on the system of 
state taxes. Among other things, they argued that the applied system did not 
make the inhabitants of the villages (towns) realise that they had to make 
their financial contribution to the maintenance of their public institutions. 
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Those who were for the independent public services argued that the 
revenues of the local governments should primarily come from the supply of 
the interest and from the independent town taxes and duties. The following 
guidelines were stated (Éberth 1931): 
• freer movement in local governments; 
• independence of the town taxes (?); 
• decrease in the importance of the village surtax. 
However, the crisis of the world economy interrupted these disputes and 
put these efforts aside for a while. 
Summarising the preliminaries of the surtaxes in Hungary, we can say 
the following (Lados, 1997): 
⇒ local governments could typically levy surtax, in a per cent of the 
central taxes limited from above, in order to achieve the balance of the 
local budget, if their other regular revenues did not cover the expenses 
of the public services carried out by the local government; 
⇒ direct taxes, usually property or corporate income taxes served as the 
basis for the surtaxes; 
⇒ the rate of the surtax to be applied in the given years – together with 
the budget of the local government – was approved of by the 
government organs (Ministry of Interior); 
⇒ the local tax administrators administered both the taxes that could be 
burdened with surtax and the taxes divided between the state and the 
local governments; 
⇒ local governments urged that the importance of the surtax be 
decreased, as its application was extremely sensitive to the changes of 
the central tax bases and tax rates – they urged the introduction of 
local taxes on independent bases , instead. 
Conclusions for the introduction of surtaxes, based on the Hungarian 
traditions: 
1. From the formerly used tax bases, central land tax ceased to exist in 
1995, and the operating property-related taxes are all local taxes. The 
surtax of the tantiem tax (?) (essentially a dividend tax) and the 
corporate tax (essentially corporate income tax) would only be 
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resources for one part of the local governments today, as in the 
majority of the settlements, there are very few taxable enterprises. 
According to the tax literature, the local taxation of the businesses 
distorts their competitiveness, so their application is less desirable. At 
the same time, the industrial tax (?) can be interpreted as a surtax of 
the VAT. From all central taxes, presently only the surtax of the 
personal income tax can be a resource for all local governments. 
2. Presently the central taxes – with the exception of the vehicle tax (?) – 
are administered by the APEH, so it is practical to allocate the 
administration of the surtax of any central tax to the APEH, too. 
3. The introduction of a surtax on any base presumes that the total 
amount of the tax burdens does not change. This means that the 
introduction of the surtax can only be implemented parallel to an 
adequate decrease in the rates of central taxes. 
 
3.2.2 International outlook 
 
The international system of the surtaxation follows the same principle as the 
system applied in Hungary before World War II, inasmuch as the role of the 
surtax is the supplementation of the resource side of the local budget to the 
level necessary for the expenses. The base of the surtax, however, is quite 
different in the former Hungarian than the present international practice. 
The Hungarian system surtaxed the property taxes and the corporate income 
tax. Both of them were direct taxes. The present international practice 
typically surtaxes the personal income tax. This means that the two systems 
do not only differ in the use of different tax bases but also in the fact that the 
tax selected for surtaxation is a bracket tax (?), usually a progressive tax, 
although this does not necessarily mean bracket rates of tax in case of the 
surtax. 
The local governmental surtaxes can have two basic types: 
• a uniform increase of the central rates of tax, or 
• a surtax defined in a standard percentage form, which is levied after 
the rates of tax in each tax bracket (?). 
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The first solution is used for example by the Nordic states, while the 
second one by Switzerland. In Sweden, the starting rate of tax is zero, so 
those who fall into the lowest brackets only have to pay the local surtax, 
which can reach 30% of the net tax base. The central government only taxes 
incomes in the higher brackets. However, the indicated maximum rate of the 
surtax is a combination of three elements, as each local governmental tier 
can levy surtax on the personal income tax. Each tier has a limited sphere of 
action as regards the rates of the taxes. The municipalities have the broadest 
field of action, they typically set the rate of the surtax from 14 to 20%. 
County governments can define a bracket of 8-12%, while the smallest local 
governmental units, the so-called parishes cannot go beyond 2%. Thus the 
total of the paid tax is combined of four elements, including the national tax. 
The multiple tax increases the administrative burdens of the employers and 
the tax authorities. 
The other method defines the rate of the surtax in a standard per cent of 
the rates used in the individual tax brackets, i.e. the rates of the surtax show 
a similar progressivity as the central tax. This means that if the majority of 
the local governments chose the same rate for the surtax, the regional 
disparities of the tax revenues would increase. 
Summarising the international experiences of the surtaxation of the 
personal incomes, we can say the following: 
⇒ all of the surtax systems applied for the personal incomes define the 
rate of the surtax adjusted to the brackets of the central tax, and the 
same rate is used in all brackets; 
⇒ in the Scandinavian model there is an upper limit built into each tax 
bracket and the same rate is used to increase the rate of the central tax, 
while in the Swiss model the rate of the surtax is defined in the same 
per cent of the adequate tax rate in each bracket; 
⇒ the Scandinavian model allows each local governmental tier to levy 
surtax on the personal income tax. 
Conclusions for the introduction of the system of surtaxes on the 
personal incomes, based on the international experiences: 
1. it can provide an income for all local governmental tiers; 
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2. it is a possibility to expand the resources of local disposition; 
3. the generation of independent resources of tax is available this way for 
the different types of local governments (municipality, county, or 
minority governments); 
4. if an upper limit is built into the system, this surtax does not distort 
considerably the competitiveness of the local economy; 
5. whatever form the surtaxation of the personal income tax takes, the 
supplementation of the personal income tax will be necessary in the 
long run, as the surtaxation can only change the regional distribution 
of the personal income tax to a limited extent. The main objective of 
the surtaxation of the personal income tax is not regional equalisation, 
but the increase of the financial independence of the local 
governments by the use of locally defined tax rates. 
 
 
3.2.3 A review of the recommendations of experts for the system of sur
 taxes 
 
The almost annual change of the division of the personal income tax makes 
the local governments defenceless and makes any financial planning for 
several years impossible right in the beginning, although that is required by 
the Act on State Finance. So from the early 1990s, recommendations and 
models have been made by foreign and Hungarian experts which would 
redeem the divided system of the personal income tax by the surtaxation of 
the personal income tax. We are only going to discuss those solutions in 
details which not only describe the advantages and disadvantages of the 
system of the surtaxation of the personal income tax but also try to model 
the effects of the transition. 
 
A/. Recommendation of the World Bank experts2
 
Bird and Wallich placed the emphasis in their recommendation on the 
increase of the resources of local disposition and on the transformation of 
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the support system when developing the finance system of local 
governments in Hungary. In their system it is not the local government that 
adjusts to the centrally distributed supports but the support system is derived 
from the difference of the estimated demand of expenditure and the local 
income capacity. The simplification of the support means that the present 
itemising capacity norms (?) should be replaced by supports connected to 
the “consumers”. The support system that considers the income capacities is 
built on the fact that the supports from the central budget (S) should be 
defined by the difference of the estimated demands of expenditure (E) and 
the local income capacity (I) (S = E – I). 
Following this logic, if the calculation of the average demands of 
expenditure is done in a normative way, by indices following consumer 
demands (number of population, age groups etc.), then the incomes 
exceeding the estimated capacity of the budget does not decrease state 
support. At the same time, the local governments really have to collect the 
estimated incomes, as the under-average “efforts” of the budget are not 
supported from the central budget. 
The introduction of this model depends on whether the local 
governments have really significant local revenues. In the period of our 
study (in 1991) this was not typical, that is why the introduction of the local 
surtaxes imposed on the personal income tax was recommended. In our 
opinion this would not increase the tax burdens of the population, as the rate 
of the central tax could decrease, depending on the locally permitted rates of 
tax. So practically only the principle of the division of the personal income 
tax would change: the division of the resources would not take place 
subsequently, but it would depend on local decisions how much the local 
governments would “add” to the lower rates of tax. 
Considering the foregoing, the authors recommended the following 
construction of the local government finance, as an alternative possibility: 
• surtax of the central personal income tax; 
• normative subsidy supplemented by an equalising personal income tax 
support (based on the simplified formula of the distribution of the 
supports, which involves the income capacity); 
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• increased local tax and duty capacity; 
• other supplementary supports. 
In the recommended model, considering the then current proportions of 
the division of the personal income tax, a 50% increase in the central rates 
of tax is necessary. The central personal income tax would completely form 
the basis of the normative support, which would include the supplementary 
personal income tax support, too. If a local government levies a 100% direct 
surtax on the national tax, then it would actually collect the former 50% 
personal income tax share from the surtax, instead of acquiring that as a 
divided revenue. In the calculation of the support, this rate of the surtax 
would be considered, but the local governments would have the possibility 
to levy surtaxes exceeding 100%, too. Any further increase in the local 
personal income tax would not change the support system but would 
increase local revenues. The surtax would be collected and transferred to the 
municipalities by the APEH. The general central/local tax burdens would 
not change. 
On the basis of the simulation, the proportion of the personal income tax 
compared to the “total” of the revenues varies, but it is usually higher in 
large towns, urban districts and in bigger settlements than in the smaller 
settlements (Table 4). The personal income tax is essentially a revenue that 
favours towns, as it is mostly collected in industrially developed regions. 
The seeming unbalance between the urban/village personal income tax is 
caused by the system of the personal income tax itself (exemption from 
taxes on personal incomes from agriculture). The network of settlements 
also influences the personal income tax revenues. The network of smaller 
villages is denser in the North and South Transdanubian regions. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 
Proportion of Personal Income Tax in the Total Revenue 
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 Share of personal income tax 
within the total revenue, in 
per cent 
Division ofthe personal 
income tax 
By administrative status   
Town (169) 27,7 78,5 
Village (2900) 17,5 21,5 
By size of the population    
                 -    1.999 13,8 7,5 
  2.000      -    4.999 18,2 8,2 
  5.000      -    9.999 19,6 5,9 
 10.000     -   49.999 21,3 20,2 
 50.000     -   99.999 24,9 9,3 
100.000    - 34,1 48,9 
Average/Total 24,7 100,0 
* Total revenue =  personal income tax + normative support + supplementary support 
Source: based on Bird és Wallich (1992), p. 99. 
 
In the villages, rural areas and small towns, the proportion of the 
personal income tax within the expenditure is lower than in the big 
settlements. The decrease of the central rates of the personal income tax and 
the parallel levy of surtaxes on the personal income tax by the local 
governments leave local incomes intact, provided that a uniform (100%) 
surtax is levied. In the municipalities with less than 2.000 inhabitants, the 
100% surtax would make 14% of the revenues. In the second group of 
settlements (2.000–10.000 inhabitants) the present revenues from the 
personal income tax are higher, making approximately 18-20% of the total 
revenues. The local surtax would mean more than 20% of the total revenues 
in the towns with more than 10.000 population. 
The simulation resulted in a different division of the resources than in the 
target figures for the 1991 budget. The simulated revenues of towns and 
other settlements with more than 10.000 inhabitants are lower than in the 
target figures, on the other hand, smaller municipalities win, as their 
financial situation is defined by the supports that make the larger share of 
the local revenues. In the smallest settlements, where the proportion of the 
personal income tax is low, the locally levied surtax could only be increased 
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at the expense of political losses. In these places a kind of equalisation of 
the differences in personal income tax is necessary. 
 
 
B/. Recommendation of the IMF experts3
 
The expert committee visited Hungary in a period when the Government 
decided to increase the share of the personal income tax given to the local 
governments, instead of decreasing it. The experts emphasised that this was 
more favourable for the local governments with higher revenues, and did 
not mean a general increase – concerning all local governments – in the 
financial independence of the local governments. Instead of disputes over 
the proportions of the division, this group of experts also argued that the 
personal income tax should be surtaxed and the local income tax applied. 
The committee mainly referred to the examples taken from the 
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark). In their opinion, the 
introduction of the local income tax would be made possible by a uniform 
10-12% decrease in the rates of the individual brackets of the central 
personal income tax. 
As the committee only spent two weeks in Hungary, they did not have 
the possibility for model calculations. Thus in their recommendation they 
outlined the technical structure necessary for the application of local income 
tax, and the timetable (schedule) preparing the application of this tax. The 
committee favoured the single-bracket rate of tax, because this does not 
enlarge the effects of the disparities coming from the per capita tax base, the 
marginal rate of tax increases at the same volume both at the high and the 
low incomes, thus providing a protection against the appearance of 
extremely high upper marginal figures. 
The IMF delegation also found that the administration of the local 
income tax should be allocated to the APEH. They did not think either that 
the system of advance tax payments should be changed by the introduction 
of surtaxation. They considered the local definition of the tax rates as an 
issue of higher significance. The called the attention to the fact that the 
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definition of an obligatory standard rate of surtax is necessary, which has to 
be applied even by the local governments with the most unfavourable 
income conditions. They consider it as important because they do not think 
it is appropriate to start a negative tax competition with the low rates of tax 
among the local governments in order to create an attraction for the location 
of entrepreneurs. They also think that the minimal rate of surtax should be 
used because it guarantees a minimal effort by the local government to 
create local resources, which can serve as a basis for the application of 
supplementary subsidies. The experts did not initiate the definition of an 
upper limit for the rate of surtax. 
The report also contained some considerable technical recommendations 
concerning surtaxation. In order to guarantee that the next year revenue of a 
local government and the connected rate of tax should be plannable, the 
central government has to finalise (by the end of July) the calculations about 
the expected tax base concerning the given local government. Then the local 
government has to make a decision concerning the rate of tax, about which, 
together with the calculated revenue, they have to inform the central 
government (by the end of September), partly because of the monthly 
transfer of personal income tax in the next year, partly in order to inform the 
employers (the payers of the advance tax payments) in time. As there will 
be differences between the transferred personal income tax instalments and 
the actual tax revenue, a supplementary settling of the accounts according to 
the actual tax payments is necessary between the local government an the 
tax administration. 
 
 
 
C/. The recommendation of Davey-Péteri4
 
The authors made their calculations by the actual data of 1993, but for the 
redemption of the local governmental part (25%) of the personal income tax 
valid for 1995. They used the following presumptions when modelling the 
shift from the division to the surtaxation: 
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1. local governments would obtain 25% of the actual personal income 
tax revenues, if surtax were levied besides a normative rate; 
2. the central rates of taxes would be decreased to such an extent that in 
case of an average rate of the surtax the position of the taxpayers does 
not change; 
3. the local governments would be given authority to levy surtax 
between a minimum and a maximum rate. 
The authors talked about two kinds of supplementation. In the first case, 
the supplementation takes place by the uniform increase in the central 
personal income tax rates. In order for the local governments to keep their 
25% proportion within the total of the personal income tax revenues, they 
should use a rate of approximately 7%, according to the authors, so the rates 
for the brackets of the central personal income tax should be decreased by 
so much (Table 5). In the second case, the supplementation related to the 
rates of the individual tax brackets is standard. In order to keep the 25% 
proportion of local governments in the personal income tax revenues, the 
rates of each tax bracket should be decreased by 20%. This method would 
keep up the progressivity of the personal income tax at the level of the local 
taxes, in a distribution identical with the central personal income tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 
Changes in Personal Income Tax Rates in course with Supplementary 
Taxation % 
Tax brackets Uniform increase of the central 
tax rate 
Uniform surtax in per cent of the 
personal income tax 
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(HUF) Central rates Rate of local 
surtax 
Central rates Rate of local 
surtax 
0 - 110.000 0 0 0 0 
110.001 - 150.000 13 +7 16,0 +4,0 
150.001 - 220.001 18 +7 20,0 +5,0 
220.001 - 380.000 28 +7 28,0 +7,0 
380.000 - 550.000 33 +7 32,0 +8,0 
   550.000 -  37 +7 35,2 +8,8 
* based on the tax table for 1993 
Source: after Davey-Péteri (1995), p. 18-19. 
 
In our opinion, the introduction of the surtax is the simpler solution, if its 
effect is neutral for both the taxpayers and the local governments, given a 
standard rate (second version). This means that the local governments 
would levy a stndard percentage of surtax on the total amount of the tax 
paid. If the standard rate were 25%, then each bracket of the central tax 
should be decreased by 20% in order to keep the former central-local 
proportion. At the same time, the local governments would be free to define 
rates higher or lower than the standard rates, so they could have surplus 
revenues of loss of revenues compared to the tax revenues generated by the 
standard rates. This would mean higher or lower tax burdens for the 
taxpayers of the individual settlements than before. If a standard rate 
different from 25% were used, this would result in the redistribution of the 
resources between the central and the local governments. This can also 
make the transformation of the support system necessary. The deviation 
from the standard rate is possible with the total freedom of decision of the 
local governments, or with building limits into the system. The authors 
suggested that the rate of the surtax range from 20-35%. This way the 
extreme rates of the surtax would range from 80 to 140% of the present 
share from the personal income tax. The calculations were made by using 
the estimations at the extremes, with the assumptions that 
 27 
1. all local governments where the share of personal income tax per 
capita is higher than the average, would levy the maximum 35% rate 
of the surtax, and 
2. all local governments where the share of personal income tax per 
capita is lower than the average would levy the minimum 20% rate of 
the surtax. 
3. Budapest was neglected in the model, because of the uncertainties of 
the division between the two local governmental tiers. 
Given the above conditions, the personal income tax revenues of the 
local governments with weaker income generating capacity would decrease 
by 20% compared to the present situation, while those local governments 
with more favourable situation would increase their tax revenues by 40%. 
On the whole, the total of the personal income tax revenues of the local 
governments would increase by 19% compared to the resources that they 
are given from the division of the personal income tax, and the local 
proportion would increase from 25 to 37%. (The authors emphasise, 
however, that the main argument fro the introduction of the surtax is not the 
possibility to create supplementary revenues, but the accountability of the 
decisions concerning local taxation and expenditure). 
The authors also dealt with the issue of the administration of the taxation. 
Based on consultations with officers responsible for personal income tax 
matters, they stated that the introduction of the surtaxation would not 
require a significant modification of the present procedure of tax 
administration. Administrative burdens would mainly appear at the 
employers, as the advance personal income tax payments would have to be 
drawn from the salaries of the individual workers at different rates, because 
of the different places of residence. On the other hand, this cannot be a 
problem for those employers that use a computerised wages accounting 
system. 
Summarising the recommendations of the experts concerning the 
surtaxation of the personal incomes, we can say the following: 
⇒ the starting point of each recommendation is to replace the share of 
the local governments from the actual central/local government 
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division of the personal income tax by a surtax on the personal income 
tax with local disposition, by decreasing the central marginal rates to 
an extent resulting in the required division of the revenues. It was 
emphasised that this way the total of the personal income tax burdens 
would remain the same. 
⇒ At the same time, local governments would have the possibility to 
deviate in both directions from the standard (normative, average) local 
surtax rate of the personal income tax, defined by the centre. 
A) The deviation from the standard rate downwards results in the 
decrease of the total tax burdens of the individual taxpayers, which 
can further reinforce the tension between the present demand of the 
expenditure and the income capacities (own resources + state 
transfers). In case of an unchanged demand of the expenditure, the 
decreasing personal income tax revenues have to supplemented. This 
strengthens the need for the increase in the other elements of 
resources (supplementary personal income tax support, or a more 
intensive increase of the normative subsidy, increase of the income 
capacities of other local taxes, consumption of the assets etc.). A 
solution for the problem can be the requirement of a minimum 
marginal tax rate, which would mean a minimal tax effort which 
could be expected from the local governments. In other words, the 
surtax on the personal income tax would increase the number of the 
optional local taxes, as it would be obligatory. The decrease of the 
general marginal personal income tax rate could have positive 
effects, as well, e.g. the willingness of taxpaying can improve, as can 
the efficiency of the tax collection.5 
B) The deviation from the standard rate upwards can result in a 
surplus revenue for the individual local governments. However, as 
the starting point of the surtaxes has always been the system of the 
actual marginal rates, a raise of the taxes above the standard rates 
would amount to marginal rates higher than the actual ones. The 
political price of that might be bigger than the visible advantages 
coming from the improving services. It can also happen that the 
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taxpaying willingness and the efficiency of the collection deteriorate 
because of the increasing rates. A solution for the problem can be 
the definition of the maximum rates of the surtax. (The experts of the 
World Bank and the Davey-Péteri recommendation define the upper 
limit for the system of the surtax on the personal income tax, but the 
IMF report does not impose such an upper limit for the local 
surtaxes.) 
C) The solutions for the division of the personal income tax are 
discussed by each expert group embedded into the general 
frameworks of the local government financing. They emphasise the 
possible expansion of the own resources. In addition to the surtax on 
the personal income tax, they emphasise the development of the real 
estate tax based on the local value. This tax is a so-called material 
tax (?), but the taxpaying is influenced also in this case by the paying 
capacity of the taxpayers, as the tax is mostly paid from incomes that 
do not derive from the use of the taxable real estate. If the surtax 
levied on the personal income tax and the development of the 
taxation of the local real estates are done at the same time, then both 
taxes have to be taken into consideration in the modelling of the 
decrease of the central personal income tax rates, as the real estate 
tax can mean an additional tax burden for the personal income tax 
payers. This implies that in case of the parallel development of these 
two tax categories we can only start from a total of personal income 
tax revenues lower than before. 
⇒ All three recommendations allocate the administration of the surtax to 
the central tax office, which shows that the shift is more likely to 
cause problems in the beginning at the employers transferring the 
advance personal income tax payments. At the same time, the two-
year delay of the appearance of the tax revenues in the local budget 
can be a problem (the surtax is meant to serve the balance of the 
budget in the given financial–planning period), as can be the date of 
the decision on the rates of the surtaxes valid for the following year. 
A) Problems coming from the two-year delay 
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In the present system, this problem is a bit overrated, as it is an 
established system. It as acceptable from the aspect of planning, as it 
is a stable resource which does not change during the year. In theory, 
the financing cannot be a problem, either, as its coverage is the 
current payments, the monthly instalments of which evidently 
exceed the current transfers which the local governments are eligible 
for based on their payments made two years ago. The problem is 
caused by the annual changes of the proportions of the division, 
about which the Parliament only decides in November. This conflict, 
however, can be well solved with programmes announced for 
several years (e.g. the method applied for the 1996-1998 period), or 
at least for the periods between the election cycles, the division 
should not be changed. 
B) The date of setting the surtax rates 
The IMF experts recommended that these rates be set by 30 
September the latest, allowing each concerned party to have enough 
time to prepare for the change. The implementation is strongly 
influenced by the fact that the frameworks defining the rules of the 
game will probably change a lot in the coming few years. These 
frameworks, however, are only defined by the Parliament in 
November–Dcember every year. The date written in the 
recommendation would only be realistic if the general frameworks 
of the regulation (changes in the central taxes, state budget) were 
available as soon as the end of August in each year. 
Problematic points concerning the surtaxation of the personal income 
tax: 
• in Hungary there are significant allowances decreasing the tax base or 
the tax itself; 
• the concealment of taxable incomes is common; 
• the incomes of the agricultural employees are only taxed to a limited 
extent. 
All three factors distort the regional distribution of the tax revenues. The 
first two factors are concentrated in the economically stronger areas (capital 
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city, large towns), while agricultural population is more concentrated in the 
villages on the one hand, on the other hand, in the settlements of the Great 
Hungarian Plain. The above-mentioned distortions are reproduced by the 
surtaxation of the personal income tax. The tax burdens would be suffered 
by the same layer – dominantly those employees who live on salaries and 
wages. 
 
3.3. The system of local taxes in Hungary 
 
The reformed system of the local taxes is just becoming mature. This is 
beyond doubt, despite the rates relatively low in the beginning. It can be 
seen in several municipalities that they are starting to consciously shape 
their tax policies, and – often on the pressure by the local taxpayers 
(transparency, accountability) – they are starting to harmonise it with the 
local settlement development and economic development policy. The 
revenues flowing in from the local taxes are also more and more significant, 
but the rapid development of the tax revenues is dominantly the result of the 
industrial tax revenues (83.9% in 1997), aside from the gradual increase in 
the number of local governments introducing local taxes and the number of 
different tax categories (Figure 1). However, this kind of tax means – ever 
more significant – revenues only for the municipalities with considerable 
economic capacities. 
On the other hand, several problems can also be raised in connection 
with the otherwise successful system of the local taxes. These are the 
following: 
• half of the local taxes that can be levied tax the population, the other 
half the enterprises. Unfortunately, the present system – partly 
because of the heavy central tax burdens – makes the local 
governments tax the enterprises instead of the inhabitants. Industrial 
tax, the communal tax of the enterprises and the property-based taxes 
paid after the buildings and sites of the enterprises make more than 
90% of the local taxes. 
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• Unfortunately it cannot be defined how much tax the population and 
how much the enterprises pay, because the central software which is 
obligatory to use for the summary of the taxes does not pay attention 
to that. The software should be transformed in a way that it should be 
able to treat separately the payments coming from the real estate tax, 
land tax and the communal tax of both the inhabitants and the 
enterprises. The central report still could be made in a division 
according to the five tax categories, but this information, which is 
very important for the formation of the local tax policy, would not be 
lost at least at the local level. 
• The revenues from the industrial tax are concentrated in the capital 
city, the big towns and other settlements with more advanced 
economic base. Because of the large-scale concentration, it was raised 
that a part of the industrial tax should be withdrawn for equalisation 
purposes (French example). Another version recommends the 
transformation of this kind of tax into a surtax of the corporate income 
tax (Illés, 1996). Neither recommendation is acceptable within the 
present frameworks, because the levying of a tax – according to the 
present regulation of the local taxes – is only a possibility which the 
local governments can use. This would practically punish those local 
governments which try to expand their own resources. The 
transformation into a surtax is problematic also because the levying of 
the industrial tax is not obligatory. In addition, local governments are 
free to define the tax rates up to the upper limit set by the law. 
• Within the narrow possibilities of the taxation of the population, the 
taxation of the real estates is still very rare. The possibilities that lie in 
this kind of tax is worth reconsidering. As there are real estates in 
each settlement, this is the type of tax that covers the widest layer of 
the population, besides the personal income tax. In addition, as real 
estates are visible, and the owner can be easily found, this tax can 
involve those layers of the inhabitants into the taxation who managed 
to evade the personal income tax. It is also an argument that the value 
of such real estates involves the level of the services provided by the 
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local governments. It is considerable that the real estate property of 
the Hungarian population is very large compared to the development 
level of the economy and the (known and admitted) income level. 
• We have discussed several times the measures to be done in 
connection with the development of the taxation of real estates (Illés, 
1994, 1996; Lados, 1993, 1995). They are still valid, with one 
exception (the significant decrease in the exemptions, which was 
made possible by the amendments of the Act on Local Taxes in 1995): 
⇒ modernisation, upgrading of the registrations of real estates, 
completion of the computerisation (it should be assessed how far the 
implementation of the land office programme, which was started 
years ago with support from the German government, has got, as the 
originally planned deadline was 1998, and it is extremely important 
from the aspect of the development of real estate tax); 
⇒ the establishment of reliable and generally accepted value 
assessment procedures is necessary (in the United Kingdom, the 
system of poll tax could be replaced within a year by the taxation of 
the real estates based on their fair market value, using the method of 
mass value assessment); 
⇒ both local governments and the population have to be prepared 
for the paying of real estate taxes, and this is the most urgent of all 
the tasks connected to the introduction of the system – a good 
preparation takes three to five years, so the introduction of the value-
based taxation of the real estates is hardly possible before 2002, 
given the present conditions. 
• The local governments less frequently use the possibility that lies in 
the land tax. The majority of the local governments start from the fact 
that they have little of such areas, where higher tax revenues could 
only be collected by using high tax rates which could be defended 
with difficulties politically. So this kind of tax is seldom used, due to 
its weak income potential. In preparatory programmes it should be 
emphasised that the objective of the levying of taxes does not 
necessarily have to be to gain revenues, but it can be used as a tool of 
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settlement policy, a very good example for which is the land tax, 
which can accelerate the development of some underdeveloped areas 
and can also be used to prevent the speculation-led land purchases in 
the neighbourhood of major community investments. (The tax 
decreases the price of the lands and the real estates.) 
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4. The system of supplementary subsidies 
 
When increasing the role of local resources – e.g. local taxes, surtax systems 
–, it is necessary to examine to what extent the distribution of the own 
resources of the local governments contributes to the reduction or 
strengthening of the disparities among the regions and the settlement types. 
So the construction of the supplementary subsidies, their transparency and 
the maintenance of the stimulation to use the local resources are issues of 
primary importance. In the resource-oriented financial planning, the divided 
personal income tax and the normative subsidies are complementary 
elements. The part of the personal income tax which remains in the centre 
becomes the basis of the subsidies distributed in a normative way. Does the 
decrease of the present proportions of division really amount to 
equalisation? It seems that in the recent years it was mostly the resource 
breakdown of the richest local government, the capital city, which has 
followed this principle. Parallel to the decrease in the share from the 
personal income tax, the weight of Budapest in the normative supports 
decreased, too (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 
Personal Income Taxes and Normative Subsidies by Levels of Territorial 
Administration, in per cent 
 personal income tax + personal 
income tax supplementation 
Normative state contribution 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Budapest 30,8 31,6 28,3 27,5 16,9 16,8 16,4 15,8 
Counties 0,0 0,0 0,7 2,5 9,0 9,1 9,3 10,1 
Big  towns** 21,3 21,9 21,0 20,4 21,0 20,7 21,3 20,8 
Other towns 22,4 21,9 22,7 22,3 23,9 24,0 24,5 24,6 
Villages 25,5 24,6 27,3 27,4 29,2 29,5 28,5 28,7 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
* According to the administrative division in effect in the given year 
** All county seats and other towns with county rank 
Source: own calculations after the database of the TÁKISZ (Hungarian Regional 
Information Service) 
 
It is worth noting that this phenomenon can only be seen in case of the 
personal income tax, because of the supplementary subsidy of that. In case 
of the normative subsidies, the resources are mostly relocated towards the 
local governments of the counties and the towns. This is the consequence of 
the normative system which in many respects takes the urban, or medium 
level services into consideration, and usually sets the rates of those services 
in the range closer to the average level of the given service. At the same 
time, in case of the responsibilities also present in the village environment, 
the normative is further away from the average expenses. 
In reality, there are several subsidies in the finance system of local 
governments which totally or to a significant extent serve equalisation 
purposes. In a sense, the task-oriented subsidies can be taken here, as they 
provide the same amount of grants after each student, or person in need of 
social benefits or health care. Besides these effects, however, these 
subsidies are mainly connected to individual tasks taken up by the state, and 
their main purpose is not equalisation but the completion of concrete tasks. 
In another part of the subsidies, the equalisation function is dominant. 
These subsidies, however, are fragmented are dislocated. Some factors 
could be found in 1997 in that group of the personal income tax “remaining 
in place” which is, so to say, burdened with tasks. These are the following: 
• supplementary subsidies for the personal income tax (19.0 billion 
HUF – villages: up to 7.073 HUF per capita, towns: up to 8.643 HUF 
per capita; 
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• general support for the villages (5.8 billion HUF – 2 million HUF per 
village); 
• subsidy for the municipal administration, communal and sports tasks 
of the local governments (19.3 billion HUF – 1.842 HUF per capita); 
• subsidies for those local governments – defined in a government 
decree – which are underdeveloped from socio-economic and 
infrastructural aspects, and for those with serious employment 
problems (2.7 billion HUF – 1.600 HUF per capita). 
The latter three purposes were elements in the former normative support 
system. On the above-listed equalisation purposes, thus within the 
frameworks accountable from the personal income tax, 46.8 billion HUF 
would be spent. The personal income tax remaining in place is burdened 
with some subsidies given to the county governments, which seems to be a 
bit strange, an odd man out here. It would be more reasonable (but it does 
not sound so nice politically) that the proportion of the division is 22%. The 
78% that remains in the centre serves as the basis for the financing of 
certain elements of the normative subsidies. In the present construction, the 
central government could account for 16% of the personal income tax in 
1997 and 20% of that in 1998, but the channels where the remaining 62 and 
60% of the personal income tax was spent is unknown, without 
transparency. (Naturally, as we have already mentioned in the chapter 
dealing with the divided personal income tax, we calculated the personal 
income tax remaining in the centre as if it all served as the basis of 
normative subsidies6. From this aspect, the coverage of the normative 
subsidies is not transparent, either, as we have not seen yet a division where 
e.g. 80% of the resources divided under the heading “normative subsidies” 
was covered by the centralised personal income tax and 20% by the VAT 
payments.) 
From the normative state contributions, two objectives can be listed 
among the equalisation elements in the narrower sense: 
• subsidy for the municipal administration, communal and sports tasks 
of the local governments (3.0 billion HUF – 312 HUF per capita); 
• subsidy for public education (1.5 billion HUF – 157 HUF per capita). 
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Different subsidies assisting developments and operation are listed as 
independent items in the state budget, making a further 69.0 billion HUF: 
• targeted and addressed grants (39.0 billion HUF); 
• subsidies with development purposes, serving regional equalisation 
(8.0 billion HUF); 
• supplementary subsidies for bankrupt local governments (6.0 billion 
HUF); 
• subsidies for local governments in handicapped situation, with lack of 
funds through not their own fault (6.0 billion HUF). 
This fragmented system, consisting of some 10 support elements, 
allocated approximately 110 billion HUF for the local governments in 1997, 
which is more than 10% of the expected total resources of the local 
governments. This amount can further grow with resources awarded from 
the Regional Development Fund, at the same time, the targeted grants 
should not be put into this category, as they typically demand own resources 
up to at least 60% of the developments, which could hardly be fulfilled by 
the local governments with weaker income positions, so they would get into 
a disadvantageous position in the competition. (It can cause further 
problems if they manage to collect the coverage of the investment, but there 
is no coverage for the operation in the future.) 
In the 1991-1994 period, the more developed counties (e.g. Gyõr-Moson-
Sopron) essentially did not receive any resources from the 18.5 billion HUF 
of the Regional Development Fund. At the same time, their share is 
considerably high from the system of targeted grants requiring substantial 
own resources, which used 52.3 billion HUF in the given period. (In the 
period in question, Western Transdanubia, which consists of Gyõr-Moson-
Sopron, Vas and Zala counties, only received 2.7% of the grants awarded 
from the Regional Development Fund, while 17.7% from the targeted 
grants.) 
This fragmented system should be put into a more comprehensible 
framework, or collected into a single equalisation support fund. The order of 
magnitude of the subsidies is as much as is covered by the local and the 
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central part of the personal income tax in both the divided and the surtaxing 
system of the local personal income tax. 
 
 
A) Separate development and operational equalisation support system 
 
The equalisation support objectives listed above could be divided into two 
main groups. One of them would provide resources of equalising character 
for the continuous operation of the local governments, while the other 
would equalise the chances for the access to development possibilities. 
1. The local governments that are awarded equalisation grants on 
different grounds usually overlap each other. Thus in the first case it is 
advised to integrate into the supplementary subsidy of the personal 
income tax the former elements of the subsidies: supplementary 
subsidy for the personal income tax, general support for the villages7, 
subsidy for the municipal administration, communal and sports tasks 
of the local governments, subsidies for local governments in 
handicapped situation, with lack of funds through not their fault, and 
supplementary subsidies for bankrupt local governments. This amount 
of approximately 60 billion HUF should be distributed through a 
support form, the supplementary subsidy for the personal income tax. 
 In the present personal income tax equalisation mechanism, more 
than 90% of the local governments are involved, so this circle is wide 
enough to cover all the settlements belonging to the former 
fragmented system of equalisation purposes. After this, only the 
average personal income tax per capita should be defined, with which 
the subsidy distributed through the equalisation of the personal 
income tax would triple. 
2. Development supports could still be operated as targeted grants. The 
category called addressed grants is not necessary by all means, if the 
grants are rendered individually to the objectives to be supported. A 
matrix could show the level of the subsidies that the objectives to be 
supported could reach at the individual local governmental types. This 
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way both horizontal and vertical fairness can be asserted in the 
supports, as each local government can get support for development 
purposes, but the extent of the support can vary, taking the special 
situations into consideration. 
It could be declared that the basis of both supports is the part of the 
personal income tax which remains in the centre. On the whole, the personal 
income tax revenues should be spent on four kinds of purposes by clear 
division principles, if we maintain the pattern of the divided incomes: 
• personal income tax remaining in place: because of the equalisation 
concerning an extremely wide circle, the 20% from the direct personal 
income tax planned for 1998 seems a bit too little. From 1999, this 
figure should be raised to 30 or 40% of the net personal income tax 
revenues8; 
• supplementary subsidies: essentially this is the total of the operational, 
and development equalisation supports gathered in the individual 
support labels, the supplementary subsidy of the personal income tax 
and the targeted grant. This total makes 35 or 30% of the net personal 
income tax revenue. (The higher figure would be the proportion in 
case of the lower share of the personal income tax directly remaining 
in place and vice versa.) 
• normative or task-oriented supports: they make 35 or 40% of the net 
personal income tax revenue. (The higher figure would be the 
proportion in case of the lower share of the personal income tax 
directly remaining in place and vice versa.) If this should not cover the 
total of the necessary supports, the missing part could be filled from 
the VAT revenues. 
• coverage of the expenses of the central tax authority: the APEH is a 
central budgetary organisation, thus its operation is financed from the 
tax revenues. That is why it is reasonable to expect that a part of the 
personal income tax revenues, which appear as a local governmental 
resource but is administered centrally, should contribute to the 
maintenance costs of the APEH. The maximum amount of this 
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contribution can be the difference between the gross and the net 
personal income tax. 
If the central and the local personal income tax were separated, the 
formula would only change inasmuch as a clear proportions of division 
among the individual support types should be declared. 
 
B) Standard equalisation fund 
 
The distribution of the support fund serving equalisation purposes could 
take place based on relatively few indices, which characterise well the 
situation of the local governments. Five such indices could be taken into 
consideration (Illés, 1996): 
1. The difference of the operational costs of the local government and 
the realistic coverage that can flow in from the local resources; 
2. population of the settlement, or the municipality; 
3. properties of the local government which require maintenance, 
renovation and management; 
4. non-real estate property of the local government, which is a potential 
material–financial resource; 
5. length of the inner roads, which is more or less proportionate to the 
road, public utility, lighting and public area maintenance tasks and the 
tasks of the local transportation. 
The other branch of the subsidies could be task-oriented grants, which is 
different from the equalisation grants both in function and economic 
political character: 
• In case of the task-oriented grants, the central government takes 
responsibility for and a certain share of the expenses from the 
provision of a concrete task. In this case it might be reasonable to 
define the guidelines for the proportion of the burdens, e.g. in the 
branches that are state responsibilities (public education, health care, 
social care) the division could be 2/3 state subsidy and 1/3 own 
resources of the local governments. 
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• The equalisation grant is a “monetarised” support, in which the central 
budget does not take any responsibility or burden in one concrete task 
or sectoral development, all they do is to contribute to the 
maintenance of the operation and the reduction of the differences. The 
indices and the normatives are only rates, based on which the 
individual support funds – defined depending on the burden bearing 
capacity of the national economy and the budget – can be divided 
among the individual local governments. 
 
4 Summary, recommendations 
 
Starting point: 
The role of the governmental (budgetary) participation in regional 
development at territorial and local level are: 
• the reduction of regional disparities; 
• the stimulation of processes desirable at national level. 
A real equalisation only takes place if the local governments in the 
backward regions have development resources, too. The precondition for 
that is, however, the stable provision for the running operational needs. 
The desirable situation in the future could be guaranteed by the 
application of a resource system at local governmental level which, on the 
one hand, promotes the increase of the financial independence of the 
Hungarian local governments, on the other hand, enables the equalisation 
among the local governments with different income capacities. The first 
objective could be guaranteed by the expansion of the resources of free 
discretion, in the second case the fragmented system should be made more 
comprehensive, transparent and efficient. 
The experts’ opinions seem to reach a consensus that two ways are 
recommended for the increase of the financial independence in the given 
Hungarian conditions. One direction is the transformation of the divided 
personal income tax revenue system into personal income tax of central and 
local discretion, the other is the development of the local real estate tax and 
the use of value-based tax on real estates. Lately the role of the industrial 
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tax in the long run has been appreciated. According to the Hungarian 
traditions, local surtaxes were levied in a certain per cent, approved of by 
the Ministry of Interior, of the central direct taxes. These included both 
property taxes and (personal and corporate) income taxes. The presently 
accepted international practice favours the surtaxes levied on the personal 
incomes. This can be a resource for all of the local governments, at the same 
time, it could expand the right to levy taxes to the medium level of the local 
governments, as well.  
The system can be created in a year or two. The years of 1997 and 1998 
are enough for the preparation, as the rules of the division of the personal 
income tax has been set for these years in a three-year programme, and this 
should not be disturbed. This would allow enough time for the introduction 
of the surtax on personal income tax from 1999. 
It is not recommended to levy surtax on the corporate sales tax and 
corporate income tax, as this would deteriorate the competitiveness of the 
local economy in the long run. It should be set, instead, to what extent the 
individual governmental transfers are financed from the individual central 
taxes. The surtax on the corporate income tax is also not recommended, 
among other things because in the list of local taxes we find the industrial 
tax, which can operate as a kind of local corporate sales tax. Its role, 
however, should not be increased but decreased in the long run. The 
industrial tax operating with higher and higher rates distorts the 
competitiveness of the local enterprises on the one hand, on the other hand, 
it can spur the tax competition among the settlements to an unjustifiable 
level. 
Among local taxes, the development of the tax on real estates, within that 
the tax on the residences is recommended. Certain element necessary for the 
shift to a value-based taxation of the real estates have been realised 
(elimination of central exemptions), others are under implementation 
(computerised real estate registration, expiration of former exemptions, 
privatisation of the real estates of the local governments), while there are 
some elements which are still missing (act on the assessment (?), training 
programmes, preparation of the inhabitants). The shift can last for a period 
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of four or five years, during which the preparation of the population for this 
type of tax is the most essential task (this should be implemented similar to 
the expansion of the personal income tax to the whole circle of income-
earners in 1998). Presently it is important from the aspect of the value-based 
real estate tax to look at where we are in the implementation of the 
recommended processes and the often mentioned strategic programme 
measures. 
The personal income tax will remain one of the fundamental elements in 
the financing of the local governmental management in the long run. In the 
1990s, as a consequence of the processes connected to the transformation 
(unemployment, regional differences of the economic decline or growth) 
and for demographic reasons, an increase is expected in the coming 
medium-term period of time in the disparities of the incomes of the 
population in the different regions and settlements. This emphasises the 
importance of the operation of the income equalising mechanism in the field 
of local government finance. 
The resources of equalisation are extremely fragmented and scattered in 
the present system of financing. Their transformation can take place the 
following way: the beneficiary local governments largely overlap each other 
as regards the equalisation grants received on different grounds. Only two 
types of equalisation grants should be used. One of them could serve the 
equalisation of the financial conditions of the operation, in the frameworks 
of the personal income tax equalisation support, while the other one would 
promote developments through the system of targeted grants. The resource 
for both supports would be the central personal income tax (or the part 
thereof that remains in the centre). 
The personal income tax would serve four purposes altogether. The local 
or surtaxed personal income tax would make 30-40% of the total of the net 
personal income tax, while the centralised or central personal income tax 
would be divided equally between the equalisation grants and the normative 
or task-oriented supports. In the latter case the proportion should be defined 
which the government will cover not from the personal income tax but from 
other tax revenues. The difference between the gross and net personal 
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income tax revenues would contribute to the coverage of the budget of the 
APEH. 
The reform of the state budget concerns the management of the local 
governments in several places. The reform of the large systems of provision, 
such as public education, social care, health care, influences the local 
governmental tasks and the macro-level resources allocated to these, and 
also the transformation of the distributing and regulating system. This is the 
most palpable for the local governments through the system of normative 
supports. It  is necessary to decide in which direction the system of 
normative supports should be developed. If normativity is meant to handle 
the regulation of the resources and the equalisation together, then a 
distribution formula consisting of only four or five indices would be 
enough. If task-oriented financing is given the priority, then this form of 
financing only has to address three fields, namely those in which state 
participation is significant: public education, social care and health care. All 
other fields – with the exception of the financing of the ethnic and minority 
local governments, which requires a special regulation – would be taken out 
of the system of the normative rates of distribution. Their coverage has to be 
achieved by the individual local governments, from the local personal 
income tax or the part thereof remaining in place, from the local revenues 
and though the equalisation systems assisting the operation. 
The pressure on the resource side could be alleviated by the more 
rational organisation of the services. This does not necessarily mean the 
forced creation of larger local governmental units. The effective operation is 
promoted mainly by two processes: one of them is the decentralisation of 
the local governmental tasks, i.e. the strengthening of the private sphere in 
certain local community services; the other one is the stimulation of the 
formation of local government associations for the common implementation 
of tasks. This should be achieved by financial regulation and not by 
administrative means, by obliging the local governments to associate with 
each other. 
 
 
 46 
Notes 
                                                 
1 If we did not consider the capital city as a whole but looked at the districts separately, 
then District 2 would lead the list of the settlements in each year. The personal income 
tax per capita generated here exceeds the countryside average by more than fivefold. 
2 The report of the World Bank on Hungary, made in 1992, focused on the budget and the 
operation of the sector of public services. The report (“The Financing of Local 
Governments in Hungary”) was made by Richard Bird and Christine Wallich. Their work 
was assisted by Gábor Péteri, expert of the financial matters of Hungarian local 
governments. 
3 In representation of the Department of Tax Affairs of the IMF, a four-member delegation 
visited Budapest and a few countryside settlements in 28 August – 14 September 1994. 
The aim of the visit was to provide technical assistance for the reform of the financing 
systems of the Hungarian local taxes and local governments. The members of the 
committee were Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Director of the Department of Tax Affairs; P. 
Bernd Spahn, fellow of the Department of Tax Affairs; Robert D. Ebel from the World 
Bank; and Jorgen Lotz, member of the experts body on tax affairs. The work of the 
committee was assisted by the Városkutató Kft. (Urban Research Ltd.), as an expert 
group of the financing of local governments in Hungary. 
4 The recommendation (“Reform of the Hungarian Local Governmental System”) was done 
by the authors on request of the Ministry of Interior, in the frameworks of the British 
Know-How Fund, in 1994-1995. 
5 In connection with the recent raises of the rates of tax, those who are against the raises 
like to refer to the so-called Laffler-curve, according to which after a certain point the 
increase of the tax rates does not increase but decrease the total of the tax revenues. In 
their opinion, in Hungary the upper margins of the tax schedule have exceeded this point, 
so in international comparison the concealment of the taxable incomes is higher in 
Hungary. However, no published analyses have been conducted examining how the 
decreases of the marginal tax rates to different extents can change the attitude to 
taxpaying and whether the personal income tax revenues can grow even with decreasing 
rates. Naturally, the volume of the tax revenues is defined not only by the rates and the 
connected willingness to pay, but also the width of the tax brackets, the scales of the 
items decreasing the tax base or the tax, and inflation. 
6 As a matter of fact, the division of 100% of the personal income tax among the local 
governments is unrealistic, as in this case this income is not burdened by administration 
costs. At the same time it can be expected that a part of the budget of the APEH should 
 
                                                                                                                            
be covered from the personal income tax revenues. This might work this way, but we do 
not know, as the accounting is not public and transparent. 
7 This support element was created at the introduction of the system of normative supports. 
Its amount per village has not changed since then: 2 million HUF for each village. In 
1991, this resource made approximately 50% of the revenues of some 50 local 
governments. By 1997, the real value of this resource dropped to one-fifth of the 1991 
value. 
8 In the essays evaluating the budget of 1997, the local governments expressed their 
grievance that the central government, when defining the proportion of the local 
governments, did not start from the gross, i.e. the total revenues, but from the net 
revenues, i.e. the personal income tax revenues specified for the individual settlements. In 
my opinion, the starting from the net personal income tax is acceptable if it is known 
what happens to the “remaining” personal income tax. This could be the easiest made 
transparent by the system handling this part as a proportion serving the operation of the 
APEH, although it still remains a question how they will account for the surplus personal 
income tax revenues flowing in from the tax controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Discussion Papers series of the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungari-
an Academy of Sciences was launched in 1986 to publish summaries of re-
search findings on regional and urban development. 
The series has 3 or 4 issues a year. It will be of interest to geographers, econo-
mists, sociologists, experts of law and political sciences, historians and every-
body else who is, in one way or another, engaged in the research of spatial as-
pects of socio-economic development and planning. 
The series is published by the Centre for Regional Studies. 
Individual copies are available on request at the Centre. 
 
Postal address 
Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
P.O. Box 199, 7601 PÉCS, HUNGARY 
Phone: (36–72) 212–755, 233–704 
Fax: (36–72) 233–704 
 
 
Director general 
Gyula HORVÁTH 
Editor 
 
                                                                                                                            
Zoltán GÁL 
 
* * * 
Forthcoming in the Discussion Papers series 
Changes in the Politico-geographical Position of 
Hungary in the 20th Century 
by 
Zoltán, HAJDÚ
Papers published in the Discussion Papers series 
No. 1 OROSZ, Éva (1986): Critical Issues in the Development of Hungarian Public 
Health with Special Regard to Spatial Differences 
No. 2 ENYEDI, György – ZENTAI, Viola (1986): Environmental Policy in 
Hungary 
No. 3 HAJDÚ, Zoltán (1987): Administrative Division and Administrative Geo-
graphy in Hungary 
No. 4 SIKOS T., Tamás (1987): Investigations of Social Infrastructure in Rural 
Settlements of Borsod County 
No. 5 HORVÁTH, Gyula (1987): Development of the Regional Management of the 
Economy in East-Central Europe 
No. 6 PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS, Ilona (1988): Chance of Local Independence in Hungary 
No. 7 FARAGÓ, László – HRUBI, László (1988): Development Possibilities of 
Backward Areas in Hungary 
No. 8 SZÖRÉNYINÉ KUKORELLI, Irén (1990): Role of the Accessibility in 
Development and Functioning of Settlements 
No. 9 ENYEDI, György (1990): New Basis for Regional and Urban Policies in East-
Central Europe 
No. 10 RECHNITZER, János (1990): Regional Spread of Computer Technology in 
Hungary 
No. 11 SIKOS T., Tamás (1992): Types of Social Infrastructure in Hungary (to be not 
published) 
No. 12 HORVÁTH, Gyula – HRUBI, László (1992): Restructuring and Regional 
Policy in Hungary 
 
                                                                                                                            
No. 13 ERDÕSI, Ferenc (1992): Transportation Effects on Spatial Structure of 
Hungary 
No. 14 PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS, Ilona (1992): The Basic Political and Structural Problems 
in the Workings of Local Governments in Hungary 
No. 15 PFEIL, Edit (1992): Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a 
Regional Centre 
No. 16 HORVÁTH, Gyula (1992): Culture and Urban Development (The Case of 
Pécs) 
No. 17 HAJDÚ, Zoltán (1993): Settlement Network Development Policy in Hungary 
in the Period of State Socialism (1949–1985) 
No. 18 KOVÁCS, Teréz (1993): Borderland Situation as It Is Seen by a Sociologist 
No. 19 HRUBI, L. – KRAFTNÉ SOMOGYI, Gabriella (eds.)(1994): Small and 
medium-sized firms and the role of private industry in Hungary 
No. 20 BENKÕNÉ LODNER, Dorottya (1995): The Legal-Administrative 
Questions of Environmental Protection in the Republic of Hungary 
No. 21   ENYEDI, György (1998): Transformation in Central european 
Postsocialist Cities 
No. 22  HAJDÚ, Zoltán (1998): Changes in the Politico-geographical Position of 
Hungary in the 20th Century 
No. 23   HORVÁTH, Gyula (1998): Regional and Cohesion policy in Hungary 
No. 24   SÁNTHA, Attila (1998): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
